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1. Introduction and overview
The Governing Council of the European Central Bank
(ECB) set out its monetary policy strategy for main-
taining price stability in the euro area in October
1998, just before the inception of the single currency
on 1 January 1999. This stability-oriented monetary
policy strategy, which was reviewed and confirmed
in May 2003, provides a medium-term framework for
analysing and assessing how changes in the
economic and monetary environment affect the
outlook for price developments and the risks for price
stability in the euro area2.
The ECB naturally takes account of the structural
characteristics of the euro area economy (notably in
terms of the functioning of its labour, product and
capital markets, the efficiency of its institutions and
the effectiveness of its adjustment mechanisms), as
well as the authorities’ structural policy measures in
these fields. More precisely, it examines how changes
in these structural features alter the economy’s
response to shocks and to what extent structural
reforms are likely to affect the euro area’s current
and expected economic and financial conditions, its
longer-term economic performance and, in partic-
ular, the medium-term outlook and risks for inflation
in the euro area.
In this context, the ECB also considers how changes
in the structural characteristics of the euro area
economy – including those resulting from structural
policy measures – may affect the conduct of
monetary policy via their impact on the operation of
the monetary transmission mechanism. The focus in
this respect is on the efficiency and effectiveness of
its interest rate actions in achieving the desired
impact on the euro area economy in general and
price developments in particular (see ECB, 2000).
Overall, this comprehensive analysis of the inflation
prospects and the optimal interest rate response
provides the basis for the ECB’s monetary policy deci-
sions, which are geared in an unambiguous manner
towards the maintenance of price stability over the
medium term. This credible anchor for longer-term
inflation expectations is an indispensable contribu-
tion to a stable economic environment in which the
decisions of other policy-makers – also in the field of
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1 Head of the EU Countries Division, Directorate General Economics, European Central Bank. The original presentation at the ETUC conference on 21-22
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2 See ECB (2004a) for a general overview of the characteristics of the monetary policy of the ECB.
structural policies – and the actions of individual
firms and households can be most welfare-
enhancing. Maintaining price stability in a lasting
manner should therefore be seen as the best way for
the ECB to support the standard of living of the euro
area’s citizens and, thereby, the realisation of the
strategic objective for the European Union (EU) set
by the Lisbon European Council in March 2000 (see
European Council, 2000; and Trichet, 2004a).
Following this introductory overview of the main
mechanisms at work, the purpose of this contribu-
tion is to give a broad-based account of the possible
interactions between the ECB’s monetary policy, on
the one hand, and structural policies in the euro area,
on the other. While it does not provide a model-
based framework, the aim is to present in a qualita-
tive manner the most relevant channels. Two ques-
tions will be addressed in this context. Section 2 will
deal with the question of how structural reforms
may affect the conduct of monetary policy in the
euro area. Section 3 discusses how, in turn, the euro
area’s monetary policy through its consistent focus
on maintaining price stability supports the reform
process and, thereby, the realisation of the Lisbon
agenda. Finally, Section 4 emphasises the urgency of
further structural reforms in Europe.
2. How do structural reforms affect the
conduct of monetary policy in the euro
area?
Starting with this first question, the key point to
observe is that structural reforms change the
economic and financial environment which is
relevant for monetary policy decisions. In particular,
effective reform measures affect the structure, insti-
tutions, flexibility, potential and performance of the
economy through various channels, depending on
the composition of reform packages. A few examples
may illustrate this point 3.
■ Completing the EU internal capital market and
deepening the degree of financial integration in
Europe would offer further scope for exploiting
economies of scale and increasing competition in
financial markets. This would relax liquidity
constraints, cut transaction costs, reduce the cost
of capital, and make it easier for investors to diver-
sify risks and hedge against the consequences of
unforeseen economic developments. The resulting
more efficient allocation of capital, in turn, should
be expected to raise the productivity of financial
investments.
■ Measures aimed at opening up goods and services
markets to domestic and foreign competition would
also offer more scope for exploiting economies of
scale, allow for a more productive (re)allocation of
resources and stimulate market entry. A higher level
of competition would reduce excessive rents of
firms, which translates into lower prices, facilitates
wage moderation and raises output and employ-
ment. More competition also creates stronger incen-
tives for firms to have a flexible production capacity
and a less rigid price-setting mechanism in place and
to be as efficient as possible. This drive towards
greater flexibility and efficiency is likely to stimulate
technological innovation and promote new invest-
ments, supporting both productivity growth and job
creation.
■ A free mobility of workers in the EU internal
market, less regulations which unduly protect the
jobs of ‘insiders’ at the expense of ‘outsiders’, and
adequate training facilities to support occupational
mobility and a better ‘matching’ between jobs and
workers should be expected to improve the func-
tioning of labour markets.Together with wage differ-
entiation in line with regional, sector-specific and
local labour market conditions and productivity
developments, this will help to avoid excessive wage
increases and reduce structural unemployment. In
this context, a more forward-looking and flexible
wage formation process increases the capacity to
absorb negative shocks, thereby avoiding prolonged
output and employment losses.
■ Well-focused fiscal reforms undertaken by the
government would complement and enhance the
above benefits. A ‘high-quality’ public sector would
offer stronger incentives to work, save, invest and
innovate. In particular, reducing distortions caused
by tax and benefit systems, relaxing excessive regu-
lations to ensure a business-friendly environment
and providing adequate facilities for education and
research would contribute to increasing the effective
supply of resources. In addition, fiscal consolidation
and lower government debt ratios would support
the public’s confidence in the longer-term sustain-
ability of public finances, thus fostering economic
stability and output growth.
Overall, appropriately designed structural reforms
aimed at well-functioning labour, product and
capital markets characterised by efficient institu-
tions and effective adjustment mechanisms will
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3 For a more detailed overview, see e.g. European Commission (2005).
translate into a more dynamic and resilient economy
with a stronger economic performance, more
employment, lower prices and higher real incomes.
For the conduct of monetary policy in the euro area,
the possible effects of structural reforms such as
those mentioned above are highly relevant. Two
aspects need to be considered in this context,
namely:
1) The impact of reforms on the medium-term
outlook for inflation and the risks for price stability in
the euro area; and 
2) The impact of reforms on the operation of the
monetary transmission mechanism and the optimal
interest rate adjustment.
As regards the first aspect, following its EU Treaty
mandate to maintain price stability in the euro area,
the monetary policy strategy of the ECB requires a
comprehensive examination of all factors of rele-
vance for the cyclical and the longer-term compo-
nents of the inflation process. The favourable impact
of well-designed EU-wide or aggregated national
structural reforms should be expected to show up in
two ways (see e.g. Duisenberg, 2003; and Trichet,
2004b). Assuming successful implementation, the
effects of such reforms would arise at the euro area
level firstly in the form of a positive supply shock
(which in some cases may be accompanied by a
negative demand shock) with possible conse-
quences for the inflation prospects. Secondly, they
change the structural characteristics of the euro area
economy. As these determine how shocks which
threaten price stability pass through the economy,
they are of key interest when analysing the inflation
dynamics and prospects. Several channels may be
considered in this respect.
From a longer-run perspective, effective reform
measures should be expected to increase the struc-
tural efficiency and flexibility of the euro area
economy and thereby its growth potential. In partic-
ular, stronger potential output growth would raise
the benchmark for desirable medium-term money
growth and raise the level at which the economy can
sustain output growth without inflationary pres-
sures arising. The outlook for inflation is also likely to
be affected by the associated reduction of structural
unemployment, which should delay the emergence
of wage pressures during a recovery. Measures
allowing for free market entry and more effective
competition should reduce excessive mark-ups of
firms, which in turn would allow for lower relative
prices in the affected sectors. This also implies that
during the period of transition to the new equilib-
rium the rate of price increases in these sectors, and
possibly also in the economy at large, would fall. A
more flexible economy, allowing for a faster realloca-
tion of available labour and capital resources would
help to avoid bottlenecks and excessive wage and
price rises. Furthermore, a greater flexibility of wages
and prices in absorbing rather than accommodating
shocks threatening price stability and a more
forward-looking behaviour of economic actors more
generally may reduce the risk of second-round
effects of such shocks appearing in the form of wage
and price increases. The implementation of supply-
enhancing reforms (especially when associated with
an initial contraction of demand) may in the short
run change the balance between aggregate supply
and demand, temporarily raising the degree of slack
in the economy. However, an offsetting factor in this
case could be that convincing structural reforms are
conducive to supporting consumer and business
confidence, thereby improving demand conditions
and the short-term economic outlook. Overall, if
there is firm evidence that structural reforms –
taking all other economic and monetary factors into
account – contribute to reducing wage and price
pressures at the euro area level, a central bank with a
mandate and strategy like the ECB will normally
react in order to maintain price stability over the
medium term.
Moving on to the second aspect, structural reforms
may also affect the conduct of monetary policy via
their impact on the operation of the monetary trans-
mission mechanism and the most appropriate
interest rate adjustment (see ECB, 2000; and Trichet,
2004a, 2004b). In particular, measures which
improve the functioning of markets (notably by
removing barriers to competition and breaking
down rigidities which constrain the adjustment of
wages, prices or supply) will tend to make it easier for
monetary policy-makers to deal with temporary
shocks to inflation. This derives from the fact that, as
noted above, in more flexible labour and product
markets, workers and firms have more room for
manoeuvre to absorb such shocks without
protracted inflationary pressures unfolding. Under
such favourable circumstances, a smaller interest
rate response than would otherwise be necessary
may be sufficient to maintain price stability.
Moreover, in less rigid economies a period of interest
rate adjustments may be shorter than otherwise, as
their impact would pass through the economy more
quickly. Accordingly, successful structural reforms
leading to better-functioning markets and a more
resilient economy also tend to reduce the volatility of
output and employment associated with shocks to
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inflation and the necessary monetary policy
reaction. Overall, structural reforms enhance the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of monetary policy actions
and thus facilitate the task of the central bank to
maintain price stability.
To the extent that structural reforms generate a
stronger dynamic efficiency and permanently raise
the level of potential output and productivity
growth, and thus the return on capital, economic
theory argues that the level of the ‘natural’ real
interest rate must rise, in order to generate sufficient
savings to meet the higher investment demand.
Arguably, from a conceptual point of view, this
‘natural’real interest rate is an important benchmark
for monetary policy, providing guidance for the
central bank’s optimal real short-term interest rate in
the long run. However, as the ‘natural’ real interest
rate is unobservable and can only be estimated with
a large degree of uncertainty, the ECB has clarified
that it does not use this concept in the actual
conduct of its monetary policy (see ECB, 2004b).
While all the aforementioned effects of structural
reforms on the euro area economy would in principle
be taken account of in the conduct of monetary
policy, a careful evaluation is always needed, since
considerable uncertainty exists about the quantifi-
cation and persistence of their impact. A relevant
question is, for example, whether favourable reform
measures should be expected to just raise the level
of economic potential as a one-off, in which case the
economy will temporarily enjoy stronger output
growth in the period of adjustment to the new equi-
librium; or, alternatively, the economy may be seen as
moving to a permanently higher potential growth
path as a result of a greater dynamic efficiency. A
similar question is whether effective reforms reduce
the rate of relative price changes in the affected
sector(s) only temporarily, or for a prolonged period
of time, for example by generating a more anti-infla-
tionary attitude among economic actors 4.
A further complication in assessing the impact of
structural reforms is that some measures may entail
short-term implementation costs, which could
trigger opposition from interest groups, even when
over time these costs would be far outweighed by
the longer-term gains for the whole society. The
occurrence and persistence of such opposition criti-
cally depend on the credibility of the political reform
process. Sometimes, reforms are not implemented in
the way they are announced, they comprise piece-
meal rather than comprehensive measures, their
design or sequencing may be questioned, their long-
run benefits are communicated poorly, or there is no
instrument in place to facilitate the adjustment
process for those affected. Under such circum-
stances, the general public might be doubtful about
the (net) positive effect of reforms. This makes it
more difficult to gain approval for new reform
measures and/or complicate their successful imple-
mentation in practice (especially when this depends
on a change of behaviour by households or firms).
Given this complex reality, in which the ‘actual
results’ of structural reforms may deviate substan-
tially from the initial ‘expectations’, monetary policy-
makers have no alternative than to take a cautious
approach when conducting a ‘real-time’ assessment
of how the whole range of structural policies will
affect the economic and financial structure and the
outlook for inflation.
Another important point to note is that there is no
mechanical link from structural reforms to the
monetary policy stance, as a decision to change
interest rates must always take account of the full
range of factors – including those unrelated to struc-
tural reforms – which determine the outlook and
risks for price stability at the euro area level.
Accordingly, accommodating a priori the positive
effects of structural reform measures, irrespective of
the prevailing uncertainties and inflation risks,
would undermine the credibility of monetary policy
in the euro area and conflict with the EU Treaty
mandate of the ECB to maintain price stability as an
independent institution 5. As discussed in Section 3,
such a result would be the exact opposite of how
monetary policy-makers could best support the
political reform process in Europe.
3. How does the euro area’s monetary
policy contribute to supporting structural
reforms and the Lisbon agenda?
The second question to address is how the euro
area’s monetary policy helps to increase the incen-
tives for implementing structural reforms and thus
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4 For a discussion of these two questions, see ECB (2006b).
5 In a similar vein, the OECD (2006, p. 17 and 54) stresses four key conditions for a monetary policy reaction to supply-enhancing structural reforms: 1) a
prevailing low and stable inflation environment; 2) a credible commitment to implement a series of reforms; 3) a prudent estimation of the positive
impact of reforms on potential output, and 4) clear signs of downward pressure on inflation in case demand does not autonomously expand in line with
the increased output potential.
contributes to the implementation of the Lisbon
agenda. The key point to note with this question is
that the ECB’s credible commitment to maintaining
price stability over the medium term, as well as its
contribution to safeguarding financial stability, have
a favourable influence on the economic and financial
environment in which the reform process takes
place. Again, two aspects may be considered, namely:
1) How price stability helps to identify where reforms
are needed; and 
2) The way price stability facilitates the implementa-
tion of reforms and the achievement of the Lisbon
objectives.
As regards the first aspect, in an environment charac-
terised by price stability it is much easier to distin-
guish changes in relative prices from changes in the
general price level. Even in an environment of stable
average prices, some prices for individual goods and
services will still be rising and prices for other goods
and services falling. This diversity in price develop-
ments reflects specific demand patterns for indi-
vidual products due to changing preferences, as well
as specific supply developments in individual indus-
tries such as those related to the pace of technolog-
ical progress. In this respect, the distribution of price
changes for individual goods and services around
the average for all products provides signals for
economic actors on the basis of which they can take
well-informed consumption and investment deci-
sions, adequately assess market developments, and
if necessary adjust their demand or supply. However,
they will not be able to recognise the signals
provided by relative prices when these are obscured
by overall inflationary tendencies.
Accordingly, an environment characterised by price
stability facilitates very much the identification of
those sectors in the economy where reforms may be
most necessary. In particular, it would be easier to
isolate excessive cost and price increases in a specific
sector when there is not at the same time a more
general tendency for prices to rise in the economy.
For example, ‘underperforming’ industries may be
faced with a lower productivity growth than other,
comparable industries, causing relatively high unit
labour cost and price increases and damaging their
competitiveness. This signals a need for efficiency-
enhancing measures to improve performance. Also,
rent-seeking behaviour associated with lacking
competition in a particular market will normally
show up in relatively strong price rises. As in an envi-
ronment of overall price stability such excessive
relative price developments will be transparent to
everybody, they provide a clear signal for the compe-
tent authorities to take corrective action aimed at
opening up the market concerned and ensuring
more effective competition. By contrast, a significant
decline in relative prices in a particular market
arising from free entry of new competitors clearly
shows the benefits of such actions for consumers
and producers 6. In a similar way, the micro-studies of
price-setting behaviour in the euro area countries
undertaken by the Eurosystem’s Inflation Persistence
Network have provided indications of the (lack of)
price responsiveness for individual product cate-
gories in the consumption basket as well as in
specific industries. These results are very useful for
identifying the sectors where reform measures
should aim at increasing competition and flexibility
(see ECB, 2005b).
Regarding the second aspect, it is important to recog-
nise the substantial benefits of price stability for
society (for an overview, see ECB, 2004a, pp. 42-43). As
already noted above, a stable general price level
makes it easier for everybody to rely on the signals
provided by relative price changes. Since the euro
area’s monetary policy via its consistent focus on
price stability provides a credible anchor for longer-
term inflation expectations, there is also no reason
for creditors to demand inflation risk premia in real
interest rates, for workers and firms to let their wage
and price formation be influenced by inflationary
tendencies, or more generally for individuals to
engage in costly hedging activities against future
inflation (or deflation) risks. Furthermore, price
stability avoids that the distortions to economic
behaviour caused by tax and social security systems
are further exacerbated by inflation (or deflation). An
environment of price stability – in conjunction with
financial stability – is therefore a vital contribution to
a stable economic and financial environment. As
inflation (or deflation) also often causes an arbitrary
and unpredictable redistribution of incomes and
wealth and typically hits the weakest members of
society most, price stability also helps to maintain
social stability.
Such an overall stable environment promotes more
forward-looking behaviour and allows for individual
decisions of workers, savers and investors about the
supply and allocation of labour, capital and other
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6 See e.g. ECB (2001) and Martin et al. (2005), which take a closer look at the case of network industries.
resources to be taken in the most efficient and
productive way. In the euro area, these benefits are
further enhanced by the many opportunities offered
by a large single currency area in which internal cost
and price transparency is not clouded by exchange
rate uncertainty.This favourable constellation, in turn,
will foster non-inflationary and sustainable economic
growth, enhance employment and support social
cohesion, in line with the Lisbon objectives.
Moreover, as noted above, in such a stable environ-
ment the benefits of structural reforms are both
more obvious and less diffuse. They are more
obvious, because the welfare-enhancing effects
would surface faster and would be more substantial.
And they are more visible, as they are not masked by
overall inflationary dynamics or surrounded by major
uncertainties about whether they are for real.
Overall, this should be expected to underpin the
credibility of the political reform process and the
Lisbon agenda. As a consequence, it will be easier for
structural policy-makers in Europe to persuade the
general public of the advantages of reforms in the
longer run and remove scepticism regarding any
short-term costs. This should facilitate the political
decision-making process in support of such reforms
as well as their implementation.
4. The urgency of structural reforms 
in Europe
As argued by Issing (2004), the ambitious Lisbon
agenda agreed in the year 2000 has been crucial
for raising Europe’s awareness of the need for
structural reforms. However, in the first few years
the implementation of this agenda was disap-
pointing. Following the mid-term evaluation of the
progress made, the European Council (2005) there-
fore decided to relaunch the Lisbon strategy and to
refocus its priorities on growth and employment –
also as a way to reach those related to the environ-
ment and social cohesion (see ECB, 2005a). In
addition, more convincing fiscal consolidation
should improve the conditions for stronger output
growth and job creation. The introduction of a
Community Lisbon Programme and the stronger
commitment of EU Member States through the
submission of National Reform Programmes (after
consultation with national stakeholders and
national parliaments) are welcome improvements
in order to pursue the implementation of the
Lisbon agenda in a more determined manner. This
determination is all the more important, as since
the year 2000 the challenges from accelerating
globalisation, rapid technological progress and
ageing populations have not abated, but only
become more pressing.
To address these challenges, a comprehensive and
consistent reform strategy would have the best
chances of success7. Completing the EU internal
market should be a key ingredient of this strategy
in order to foster an efficient allocation of
resources, larger economies of scale and an attrac-
tive business environment in which competition is
the driving force behind ongoing investment,
innovation and the creation of new firms and jobs.
The necessary labour market measures are wide-
ranging. They should comprise reform of tax and
benefit systems to increase labour supply, both in
terms of the number of workers and the hours
worked on a life-time basis 8; address labour
market rigidities and promote wage flexibility to
increase labour demand; and create better life-
long education and training systems as a way to
improve human capital and prepare workers for
the future 9. Last, but not least, governments need
to contribute their share by providing sustainable
and high-quality public finances (see e.g. ECB,
2006a). In line with the original strategic goal of
the Lisbon agenda, such a comprehensive and
consistent reform package would be conducive to
a more dynamic and ‘shock-resistant’ European
economy, which features well-functioning labour,
product and capital markets and stronger incen-
tives to work, save, invest and innovate.
As noted by the European Council (2006),
enhanced structural reforms and further fiscal
consolidation are of special importance for the
euro area countries. A more critical assessment of
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7 Evidence presented by Hauptmeier et al. (2006) suggests that public expenditure reforms in industrialised countries in the 1980s and 1990s were most
successful in terms of raising economic growth and improving 
fiscal performance if they were part of a comprehensive package rather than a piecemeal approach. Annett (2006) stresses the consistency of structural
policies, both internally and over time, as a keylesson from successful reform cases, i.e. the selected product market, labour market and fiscal 
reforms should complement and reinforce each other and be continued over a longer period.
8 For an analysis of the causes and consequences of the trend decline in average hours worked in euro area countries over the past decades, see Leiner-
Killinger et al. (2005).
9 See ECB (2002) for a discussion on the efficiency of the matching process on the euro area labour market.
the progress made by these countries would
therefore be in order. Three arguments may be
offered which support this view. In the first place,
well-functioning markets and stronger supply
incentives would offer scope to better exploit the
substantial welfare-enhancing benefits of the
euro associated with the implied internal cost and
price transparency and low transaction costs.
Given these benefits, the adoption of the single
currency should in principle have created strong
incentives for euro area countries to undertake
reforms – even if a supporting monetary policy
reaction, as explained above, cannot be taken for
granted (compare Duval and Elmeskov, 2006; and
OECD, 2006, p. 54). Secondly, in an integrated
single currency area the advantages of moving to
flexible euro area economies are more obvious, as
this would increase the capacity to cope with
asymmetric shocks. For example, in several euro
area countries structural reforms should promote
more rapid wage and price adjustments and more
effective adjustment mechanisms in general in
order to deal with deviating trends in intra-euro
area competitiveness. Thirdly, moving to sound
public finances would create scope to let auto-
matic stabilisers work in case of asymmetric
shocks in the euro area. Moreover, fiscal discipline
and the long-term sustainability of public finances
in the member countries are essential to underpin
confidence in the internal and external stability of
the euro. Overall, realisation of the Lisbon agenda
would improve the performance of the euro area
economy, increase its resilience to shocks, and also
strengthen its cohesion. This is vital for the long-
term credibility of the euro.
While there is a political consensus about the
urgency of further structural reforms in Europe,
there is still some resistance to taking the neces-
sary steps. Some observers have raised the
question of ‘the right time’ for implementing
structural reforms. As observed by Blanchard
(2006, p. 47), reforms encounter less opposition in
an economic upswing, when unemployment is
falling. However, he also notes that a cyclical
upturn in fact also alleviates the political need for
reforms and thus tends to delay rather than
encourage them. This suggests that the under-
lying economic challenges facing a society must
rather be addressed as and when they arise, irre-
spective of the stage of the business cycle 10.
Postponing unavoidable measures would not
increase the chances of their implementation, but
only raise the burden of adjustment and prolong
the period needed to offset any initial output and
employment losses.
The challenge is to explain in a convincing manner
the need to rejuvenate the European economy and
the longer-run welfare-enhancing benefits of
reforms to the general public, while facilitating to
the extent possible the adjustment process for
those affected. For its part, the ECB will continue to
support the reform process in Europe, in the first
place by maintaining price stability for the euro
area; secondly, by contributing to safeguarding
financial stability; and, finally, by explaining the
necessity of structural reforms for safeguarding
the standard of living of Europe’s citizens.
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1. Introduction
Potential output measures a country’s sustainable
aggregate living standard and is thus one of the
most important categories of economics. It is also a
key indicator for monetary and fiscal policy. The
ECB, for example, uses the output gap – the relative
difference between potential output and GDP – as
a leading indicator of inflation and requires a
precise growth rate of potential output to deter-
mine its reference value for M3. Potential output is
also relevant for fiscal policy and medium-term
fiscal planning, for example to determine the struc-
tural budget deficit. Despite its importance,
however, potential output is a difficult concept to
pinpoint both theoretically and even more so
empirically.
In this article results are presented that highlight the
theoretical difficulties of defining potential output in
an unambiguous way. We then discuss the causes of
the marked revisions of potential output estimates by
major international research institutions. In the final
section policy conclusions are drawn from the fact
that estimates of potential output are rather inexact
and even unreliable.
2. Potential output in a theoretical
perspective
Potential output is the sustainable level of real (infla-
tion-adjusted) GDP. It is constrained due to limited
natural resources (population, raw materials), insti-
tutional factors (e.g. on labor markets) and the factor
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